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Episodic retrieval is characterized by the subjective experience of remembering.This expe-
rience enables the co-ordination of memory retrieval processes and can be acted on
metacognitively. In successful retrieval, the feeling of remembering may be accompanied
by recall of important contextual information. On the other hand, when people fail (or strug-
gle) to retrieve information, other feelings, thoughts, and information may come to mind.
In this review, we examine the subjective and metacognitive basis of episodic memory
function from a neurodevelopmental perspective, looking at recollection paradigms (such
as source memory, and the report of recollective experience) and metacognitive paradigms
such as the feeling of knowing). We start by considering healthy development, and pro-
vide a brief review of the development of episodic memory, with a particular focus on
the ability of children to report first-person experiences of remembering. We then con-
sider neurodevelopmental disorders (NDDs) such as amnesia acquired in infancy, autism,
Williams syndrome, Down syndrome, or 22q11.2 deletion syndrome. This review shows
that different episodic processes develop at different rates, and that across a broad set of
different NDDs there are various types of episodic memory impairment, each with possibly
a different character. This literature is in agreement with the idea that episodic memory is
a multifaceted process.
Keywords: episodic memory, recollection, metamemory, neurodevelopmental disorders
INTRODUCTION
Episodic memory is a system which permits people to retrieve
memories characterized by temporal, spatial, and self-referential
features. Tulving (1985) characterized episodic memory as “auto-
noetic” (self-knowing). This state of awareness was related to the
recollection of a specific personal context for the retrieved infor-
mation. From this original description, many different theories
have spawned (see reviews from Yonelinas, 2002; Mandler, 2008;
Moulin et al., 2013). In experimental settings, recollection is often
operationalized as the “recall of information that was experienced
during the study episode that is cued by a recognition test stim-
ulus” (Montaldi and Mayes, 2010, p. 1294), and can either be
measured by subjective report (e.g., Tulving, 1985) or by objec-
tive reports asking the participant to reproduce material from the
study phase, such as the source of the information (e.g., DeMas-
ter and Ghetti, 2013). It can be characterized as the retrieval of
“something more” – the idea that associated thoughts, feelings,
or material from the time of encoding come to mind or can be
brought to mind at the time of retrieval (Moulin et al., 2013).
The idea of recollection places great emphasis on operations
occurring at retrieval, rather than the content or“type”of memory
retrieved (Klein, 2013). Klein et al. (2004) suggested that for mem-
ory content to be experienced as episodic at retrieval there are
four critical factors: (1) sense of agency, (2) sense of ownership,
(3) a capacity for self-reflection, and (4) a sense of time as per-
sonal events happening in relation to the self. Such a capacity
for reflection is defined as “metacognitive” – the ability to know
about one’s own mental states. A prominent model of metacog-
nition (Nelson and Narens, 1990) involves two levels of cognitive
processes, an exchange of information between a higher order
representation and an object level, where mental operations are
carried out. Memory proficiency is achieved by the regulation
and awareness of the information exchanged between these two
levels. In the case of recollection, presumably on-line feelings
and thoughts generated during retrieval by the object level are
monitored by the meta-level, leading to the implementation of
mnemonic strategies, termination of search, and so on.
Retrieval from episodic memory, then, is a complex reflective
process. There is a an extremely large literature which points to
the complexity of the episodic system, and in healthy adults, a
lot is known about the strategic and reflective processes which
contribute to effective memory function. Much of this literature
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considers metamemory and subjective report. The aim of this
review is to set this large literature against what we currently know
about episodic memory in children and neurodevelopmental dis-
orders (NDDs). We focus on episodic memory as measured by
the recall of rich contextual details and in recollection paradigms
(described below). We also present subjective states as measured
by first-person experiences of remembering. Finally, to consider
strategic and reflective aspects to episodic memory, we consider
metamemory function. We start by reviewing healthy develop-
ment (see Typically Developing Children). The last part of the
paper then considers episodic memory, metamemory, and subjec-
tive states of episodic memory in NDDs with a neuropsychological
approach (see Neurodevelopmental Disorders). In the discussion
(see Discussion), we show that this review supports the idea of
a fractionation of the episodic memory system and how a devel-
opmental approach agree with the idea that there are separable
subjective and objective components in episodic memory.
TYPICALLY DEVELOPING CHILDREN
Many studies have now explored children’s ability to remember
detailed memories and whether this capacity improves through-
out childhood and adolescence (see Episodic Memory below). In
contrast, the development of the ability to introspect on memory
contents (subjective states of recollection) or estimate memory
contents (metamemory) has not been explored so often. Because
one of the main issues in the subjective experience of memory
is the putative difference between recollection and familiarity,
we next review these two processes in healthy children (see The
Subjective Experience of Memory below). We then develop this
emphasis on subjective experiences to take on well-known mea-
sures of retrieval failure and metacognitive paradigms such as the
feeling of knowing (FOK) (see Metamemory below). Finally, we
provide some neuroimaging findings to illustrate the contribution
of the brain maturation to the development of episodic memory
(see Neurodevelopmental Approach below).
EPISODIC MEMORY
Tulving (2002) suggested that the ability to form episodic mem-
ories does not emerge until 4 or 5 years of age (Newcombe et al.,
2007; Hayne and Imuta, 2011; Scarf et al., 2013). In fact, several
studies show that the ability to form new specific personal events,
rich in contextual details, improves during childhood until adoles-
cence (e.g., Brainerd et al., 2004; Ghetti and Angelini, 2008; Howe
et al., 2009). For example, Bauer et al. (2012) showed an age-related
difference in the development of children’s memory for the spatial
locations of personal events; older children are more likely to inte-
grate spatial information into their autobiographical memories
than younger children.
Many studies now suggest the existence of different develop-
mental trajectories for the different components of episodic mem-
ory. In particular, recent studies have shown that familiarity-based
processes develop earlier than recollection-based ones (Billings-
ley et al., 2002; Ghetti and Angelini, 2008; Brainerd et al., 2012).
Research has also shown that recalling contextual information
develops later than recalling the information itself (Cycowicz et al.,
2001, 2003; Pirogovsky et al., 2006). In this context, Sluzenski et al.
(2006) showed an age-related improvement in remembering the
association between contextual information and factual content
between the age of 4 and 6 (see Picard et al., 2012 for similar
findings).
THE SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE OF MEMORY
Studies exploring developmental changes in the ability to intro-
spect on memory are relatively limited. Research into subjective
experience of memory in children has mostly used the Remem-
ber/Know paradigm (RK, Tulving, 1985). This requires partici-
pants to categorize their responses on a recognition memory test
according to whether they remember the answer, as opposed to
knowing it or finding it familiar. A first study by Perner and
Ruffman (1995) suggested that young children could not reliably
differentiate remembering and knowing; children could not judge
what originates from personal experience before the age of 3. In a
more recent study, Ghetti et al. (2011) also asked children to clas-
sify memories into “Remember” or “Familiar” categories. They
showed that 6- to 7-year-olds found it difficult to differentiate
between states of recollection and familiarity but their level of
understanding was nonetheless above chance.
From about the age of 8, children begin to report more expe-
riences of remembering on memory tests, with a developmental
trend in the subjective experience of recollection (Billingsley et al.,
2002; Ofen et al., 2007; Piolino et al., 2009; Friedman et al., 2010).
For example, Billingsley et al. (2002) showed an increase in the
proportion of Remember responses with age (from 8 to 19 years),
with the youngest group giving fewer correct Remember responses
(5% for the youngest group versus 28% for the oldest group). In
a more recent study also using the same paradigm, Rhodes et al.
(2011) confirmed these findings and suggested that 11-year-olds
can engage recollection to the same degree as adults.
Ghetti et al. (2011) explored whether or not the nature of the
subjective recollection changed during childhood, and whether
the qualitative details of memories changed. In their Experiment
2, children were shown line drawings presented either in red or
green. At encoding, they were asked to state aloud the color and
were also asked a semantic question. At the retrieval stage, par-
ticipants reported Remember or Know for each item. This was
followed by an old-new recognition decision and a source dis-
crimination judgment (color and question asked). Across all ages,
children were more likely to give correct source information to
Remember judgments, showing that even young children (e.g., 6-
to 7-year-olds) could differentiate between Remember and Famil-
iar judgments. However, young children (before the age of 10) were
more likely to wrongly associate correct source with Familiar judg-
ments. Furthermore, older children were more likely to experience
subjective recollection when they remembered semantic informa-
tion. According to Ghetti et al. (2011), this indicates that older
children are more aware of the factors which give rise to a feeling
of recollection and are more skilled at using that diagnostic infor-
mation. In other words, children possibly become metacognitively
more competent at using source information to support the recol-
lection of a detailed memory. In the next section we follow up this
idea, reviewing the scientific literature on metamemory in healthy
children.
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METAMEMORY
Historically, metamemory has either been investigated from a
developmental psychology perspective (see Flavell, 1979) or exper-
imental memory viewpoint (Hart, 1965). The developmental lit-
erature has mainly focused on memory strategy and what children
know about memory functioning whereas, experimental memory
research has generated specific and reliable methods to measure
people’s ability to introspect on their memory processes (Nel-
son and Narens, 1990). Recent work has taken these experimental
paradigms into developmental populations, uniting these two oth-
erwise disparate approaches to metamemory (for reviews, see
Schneider and Lockl, 2002; Lyons and Ghetti, 2010). In this work,
experimental paradigms are used in which children are asked to
predict their future memory performance either while retrieving
the information (e.g., FOK; Hart, 1965; Schacter, 1983; Sacher
et al., 2009) or during learning (e.g., Judgment-of-learning, JOL;
Arbuckle and Cuddy, 1969). The extent to which children have
proficient metamemory is captured in their ability to accurately
predict their performance.
In a typical JOL procedure, participants are presented with
cue-target pairs and asked to make a JOL reflecting the likeli-
hood that they will later recall the target word when presented
with the cue word. Using such a task, Koriat and Shitzer-Reichert
(2002) showed a developmental trend, with children becoming
more accurate as they get older and thus more able to predict
their recall performance. In a typical episodic FOK experiment,
participants are presented with word pairs and at test, if they
cannot recall the target, they are asked to predict whether they
will be able to recognize it later. FOK judgments are thus pre-
dictions about the likelihood of subsequent recognition of cur-
rently non-recalled information (Hart, 1965; Nelson and Narens,
1990). Using this paradigm, Wojcik et al. (2013a) have showed
that children (aged 12) could accurately predict their memory
performance when asked to give episodic FOK judgments. How-
ever, whether or not a development trend on episodic FOK exists
is difficult to determine as most developmental FOK studies
have used general knowledge, or pre-learned semantic material.
However, such studies do report that FOK accuracy improves
continuously across childhood and adolescence (Wellman, 1977;
Cultice et al., 1983; Wojcik et al., 2013a, but, see Butterfield et al.,
1988).
Other studies exploring the development of metacognitive
monitoring have shown that the accuracy of confidence judgments
about memory retrieval of individual items improves during late
childhood (age 7–12 years; von der Linden and Roebers, 2006;
Ghetti et al., 2008; Krebs and Roebers, 2010). Furthermore, young
children have a good metacognitive knowledge (Flavell, 1979).
Studies have also shown that from a young age children understand
some of the factors influencing memory, thus showing metacogni-
tive knowledge (Lyon and Flavell, 1994). For example, Ghetti et al.
(2002) showed that children as young as 5 or 6 can monitor varying
degrees of memory strength as indicated by changes in their con-
fidence ratings. In a similar vein, two studies have demonstrated
that children can accurately use their metacognitive knowledge
to make predictions; children assign higher JOLs to judged-easy
pairs than to judged-difficult pairs (Koriat and Shitzer-Reichert,
2002; Lockl and Schneider, 2003). Thus children can modulate
their JOLs according to their metacognitive knowledge – they are
sensitive to the difficulty of to-be-learned material.
Metacognitive judgments such as JOLs or FOKs are important
as they will impact on the learning processes and the memory
strategies put into place. This is illustrated in the metamemory
framework proposed by Nelson and Narens (1990) by the fact that
monitoring (the subjective experience) and control processes (the
behavior) operate in a feedback loop: through memory monitor-
ing, we control our memory function and implement appropriate
mnemonic strategies (the “monitoring affects control hypothesis,”
Nelson and Leonesio, 1988). As a result, proficient metamemory
functioning should ensure effective memory performance. To the
best of our knowledge only one study has explored the relationship
between monitoring and control from a developmental perspec-
tive. Lockl and Schneider (2003) showed that for both first and
third graders, JOLs made during the first study trial predicted the
amount of time that the children invested in each item in a sub-
sequent self-paced study trial. This relationship between JOL and
study time became stronger for third graders (age 9 years).
NEURODEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH
Neuroimaging studies provide evidence that brain maturation
contributes to the development of the episodic memory. There
is a growing body of evidence showing that major age-related
changes occur before puberty with a slight evolution until adult-
hood focusing mainly on frontal regions (Figure 1). These changes
include cerebral networks devoted to memory functioning: medial
temporal lobe structures, parietal, and frontal regions (Paz-Alonso
et al., 2008; Ghetti et al., 2010). There is a complex developmental
pattern observed in the connections between frontal and tempo-
ral regions, and development of these connections continues into
adulthood. Otherwise, the only functional neuroimaging study in
children which has focused on subjective recollection evaluated
with the RK paradigm points to an age-related increase in activa-
tions of the prefrontal cortex (Ofen et al.,2007). Some other studies
have revealed a medial temporal specialization with increasing age.
Longitudinal studies showed that the anterior hippocampus may
decrease relatively in volume from age 4 to 25, while the posterior
hippocampus may increase (Gogtay et al., 2006). This structural
maturation influences the cerebral network recruited to process
episodic memory tasks with age as shown by functional brain
imaging studies. For instance, Ghetti et al. (2010) were interested
in activations during incidental encoding of items as a function
of subsequent memory of items and details associated with tar-
get items. Their results revealed that youngest children, aged 8,
recruit the hippocampus and posterior parahippocampal gyrus
for both item recognition (line drawings) and associated details
(color of ink), whereas the 14 years olds engaged these regions
only for subsequent detail recollection. Finally, it is worth noting
that the medial temporal and prefrontal regions are not the only
structures implicated in the development of episodic memory. A
graded activation of the posterior parietal cortex is associated with
correct episodic performances (Paz-Alonso et al., 2008; Ofen et al.,
2012; DeMaster and Ghetti, 2013).
A converging body of arguments also indicates that the poste-
rior parietal cortex is implicated in episodic retrieval and subjective
recollection in adults (Shimamura, 2011). The temporo-parietal
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FIGURE 1 | Gray matter maturation from 8 to 30 years: regression plots
showing the relationship between age and bilateral cortical volume
(corrected for the total brain volume) of each lobe and the hippocampus.
The non-linear decrease in cortical lobe volume contrasts with a slight
increase in hippocampal volume. Parietal and occipital lobe seem to mature
earlier than temporal and frontal lobes. Adapted from Ostby et al. (2009).
junction a one of the cerebral regions referring to the Cor-
tical Medial Structures (CMS) involved in autobiographical
memory and critical for self-development (Pfeifer and Peake,
2012). The parietal cortex could also play an important role
in mnemonic control by modulating top-down (frontal) and
bottom-up (medial temporal structures) processes (Paz-Alonso
et al., 2013). Hence, abnormal functioning of one cerebral region
included into this network would result in a specific pattern of
episodic impairment. This point will be detailed in the following
sections.
NEURODEVELOPMENTAL DISORDERS
The cognitive neuropsychological approach to memory function
has a long history of using patterns of deficit and dysfunction to
better understand and treat memory impairment, but also patient
studies yield an important data set by which to evaluate cognitive
models and further theories. This review argues that a neuropsy-
chological approach to episodic memory is necessary to under-
stand further the development of episodic memory generally. In
this section, studies on NDDs (such as autism or chromosome
disorders) are presented to show how these disorders represent
an opportunity to better understand the contributions of separate
sub-components to episodic memory.
Neurodevelopmental disorders affect neural development with
direct consequences on learning. A working definition was pro-
posed by Milan (2013):
“NNDs are generally accepted to be disorders diagnosed
before the age of 18 where: Central nervous system develop-
ment is impaired and/or delayed, leading to either disruption
of discrete cerebral functions, or to generalized impairment
across multiple domains” (Milan, 2013, p. 8).
It is possible to further classify disorders according to whether they
are genetic (either discrete genetic abnormalities, such as Down
syndrome (DS); or multiple anomalies in “polygenic” disorders,
such as autism), or acquired (early and congenital brain injuries,
such as anoxia). In this review, our drive was to understand more
about the processes involved in episodic memory function and
dysfunction during development. Rather than being exhaustive in
terms of etiology, we organize our review around the key popu-
lations which have attracted most attention: amnesia acquired in
infancy following anoxia, traumatic brain injury (TBI) or tumors
[see Amnesia Acquired in Infancy and Childhood (Anoxia, Trau-
matic Brain Injury, Brain Tumors)], autism (see Autism), and
chromosome disorders (see Williams Syndrome, Down Syndrome,
and 22q11.2 Deletion Syndrome).
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AMNESIA ACQUIRED IN INFANCY AND CHILDHOOD (ANOXIA,
TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY, BRAIN TUMORS)
In this section, we present studies of children and adolescents with
acquired amnesia due to anoxia, TBI, and brain tumors. Table 1
presents a summary of the different findings.
Episodic memory studies
The amnesic syndrome is commonly understood to be a profound
disorder of episodic memory in association with preserved or
relatively preserved short-term memory and general intellectual
abilities (Mayes, 1999). Episodic memory deficits can be caused
by different factors such as lesions to the bilateral areas of the hip-
pocampus as a result of anoxia, TBI, tumor, or cerebrovascular
accident. The first reported case of amnesia with childhood onset
is CC (Ostergaard, 1987). CC became amnesic following an anoxic
episode at the age of 10 which resulted in multifocal brain dam-
age also involving the hippocampal and parahippocampal regions.
While his vocabulary acquisition was far from normal in a 5-year
follow up test, he did show some progress suggesting that at least
some residual learning took place in the absence of any measurable
episodic memory. Broman et al. (1997) reported a 19-year follow
up study of a boy who sustained focal hippocampal injury due to
an anoxic episode at the age of 8 years; his brain injury severely
compromised his episodic memory.
More recently, the episodic deficits in pediatric brain tumor
patients have been explored. Brain tumors are the most com-
mon solid malignancies in childhood (Saran, 2002). Survivors of
brain tumors often acquire complex cognitive difficulties includ-
ing impairments in attention, processing speed, and different
aspects of memory (Palmer et al., 2007). In particular, pedi-
atric neuropsycho-oncology studies reveal clear episodic memory
deficits (Guillery-Girard et al., 2004; Martins et al., 2006; Vicari
et al., 2007; Svoboda et al., 2010). For example, CL developed
severe anterograde amnesia following the surgical removal and
subsequent chemo- and radiotherapy treatment of an ependy-
moma at the age of 4 years (Vicari et al., 2007). CL showed signs of
significant memory difficulties in everyday life: she was not able to
remember things she was asked to do and where she had put things.
Table 1 | Key findings on episodic memory and metamemory in children and adolescents with anoxia, brain tumor, and traumatic brain injury.
Article/etiology Age (years) Main finding
At injury At test
ANOXIA
Ostergaard (1987) 10 (single case) 15 Residual learning in the absence of measurable episodic memory
Broman et al. (1997) 8 (single case) 27 Severe episodic memory deficits
Vargha-Khadem et al.
(1997)
Perinatal (single cases) 14, 19, 22 Profound episodic memory deficit in the context of normal knowledge
acquisition during childhood
Baddeley et al. (2001),
Düzel et al. (2001)
Perinatal (single case) 23 Jon’s recognition memory is selectively supported by familiarity. Difficulty
appreciating the difference between remembering and knowing
Picard et al. (2013) Perinatal 1 month 18, 19 No sense of recollection associated to bilateral hippocampal atrophy
Rosenbaum et al. (2011) Perinatal (single case) 20 Greater deficit in recollection than in familiarity
BRAINTUMOR
Guillery-Girard et al. (2004) 3 and 6 (single cases) 10, 11 Ability to acquire novel semantic concepts despite profound episodic
memory deficitsMartins et al. (2006) 6 and 5 (single cases) 9.5, 7
Vicari et al. (2007) 3 (single case) 8 Profound episodic memory deficits with generally preserved semantic
memory competencies
Svoboda et al. (2010) 13 (single case) 18 Severe episodic memory impairment with relatively well preserved general
intellectual functioning
Pauly-Takacs et al. (2011,
2012)
11 (single case) 14 Profound episodic memory deficit in the context of well preserved
premorbid semantic memory and new semantic learning. Lack of insight
into own memory processes
TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY
Hanten et al. (2000) 6 11 Verbal learning is within normal limits, but metacognitive predictions are
less accurate compared to controls
Hanten et al. (2004) 7 12 Verbal learning and metacognitive monitoring are within normal limits, but
ease-of-learning judgments are less accurate compared to controls
Crowther et al. (2011) 10 10–12 Verbal learning and metamemory poorer in children with severe TBI
compared to milder forms of TBI and controls
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She had difficulties in reporting autobiographical events span-
ning from the previous few days to years. Similarly, CJ acquired
a profound anterograde amnesia following treatment for a rare
childhood brain tumor (germinoma) when he was 11 years old
(Pauly-Takacs et al., 2011, 2012). CJ experienced particular dif-
ficulty retrieving context-rich episodic memories whether they
had been encoded before or after the onset of his brain injury. In
comparison, his premorbid general knowledge, vocabulary, and
autobiographical information were remarkably well preserved.
He was able to establish novel semantic facts in laboratory tasks
and successfully updated the semantic component of his autobi-
ographical memory in the 5-year period after diagnosis. A series
of experiments demonstrated that CJ’s amnesia was characterized
by a disproportionate deficit in source memory relative to item
memory, whereby he permanently failed to accurately report the
source or the context of a prior learning episode. Strikingly, his
source memory deficit extended to encoding manipulations which
enhance learning (e.g., self-generation by imagination). That is,
although performance improved with self generation, CJ was no
more able to accurately state that a correctly retrieved word had
been in an imagination condition or not. This suggests that he was
not consciously aware of the benefit in his performance, otherwise
the logical response would be to adopt a bias, “if I remember this
it must be because I self generated it earlier.” Further experiments
suggested that CJ’s episodic retrieval was severely compromised
by his inability to use source information as a basis for conscious
recollection – even if this information was retained in memory
(Pauly-Takacs, 2012). To date, studies exploring subjective states
associated with memory have not yet been introduced to pediatric
neuropsycho-oncology.
Vargha-Khadem et al. (2001) proposed the term developmental
amnesia (DA) to describe cases who acquired focal bilateral hip-
pocampal pathology very early in life following hypoxic-ischemic
episodes (Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997; Gadian et al., 2000). These
patients (as adolescents or young adults) presented with a disso-
ciation between episodic and semantic memory. While they had
a profound impairment in remembering daily life events, they
attended mainstream education where they acquired literacy skills
as well as normal levels of intelligence and knowledge. DA is par-
ticularly interesting because, as opposed to adult-onset amnesia,
there is no well-established prior memory competence that is sub-
sequently lost as a result of a specific brain insult. This led to
strong theoretical claims about the functional and neural organi-
zation of declarative memory during development. Based on cases
of DA, a neuroanatomical model of declarative memory was pro-
posed which postulates that the development of semantic memory
depends on parahippocampal cortices but not on the hippocam-
pus, while episodic memory development largely depends on the
hippocampus (Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997; Gadian et al., 2000).
In the original description of DA by Vargha-Khadem et al.
(2001), the authors suggest a distinction between recollection-
based versus familiarity-based judgments. However, studies
exploring whether or not children with DA can recall detailed
episodic memories and also introspect on these memories are
extremely rare. To date, most of the evidence comes from a widely
studied case of DA, Patient Jon, who became amnesic as a result of
perinatal anoxic episode. The available evidence seems to converge
on the conclusion that Jon’s recognition memory is selectively sup-
ported by familiarity (Baddeley et al., 2001). While Jon readily
assigned R responses to a good proportion of correctly recognized
items, his justifications for them did not reflect true recollective
experience; rather, it appeared that Jon gave “R” judgments when
he experienced a sense of ease of access to the items (i.e., fluency
as opposed to contextual retrieval) which gave rise to higher confi-
dence in his memory (Baddeley et al., 2001; Gardiner et al., 2008).
It was also shown that Jon’s recognition memory performance fell
significantly below that of controls in tasks where recognition is
usually facilitated by recollection specifically (e.g., deeper process-
ing, task-enactment) (Düzel et al., 2001; Gardiner et al., 2008).
Finally, at the physiological level, it has been demonstrated that
Jon lacks the event-related potential (ERP) index of recollection.
Consistent with the above, a recent assessment employing the
Process Dissociation Procedure (PDP; Jacoby, 1991) found that
Jon’s recognition memory is characterized by intact familiarity
but severely compromised recollection (Brandt et al., 2009). In
this paradigm, participants complete two different memory tasks,
one where they merely have to identify whether or not they have
studied the item before, and one where, additionally, they have to
specifically declare where or when the item was studied. By com-
paring performance on the test assessing specifics (which requires
recollection) and the test asking for a simple old/new distinction
(which merely requires familiarity) it is possible to estimate the
separate contributions of familiarity and recollection.
More recently, Picard et al. (2013) explored recollection as mea-
sured by the RK paradigm in two cases of DA (Valentine and
Jocelyne, both adults who suffered from brain injuries that led
to bilateral atrophy of the hippocampus). Both patients’ episodic
memory was first assessed using the House test (Picard et al.,
2012), an ecological test designed to assess what-where-when fea-
tures coupled with RK judgments. On this task, both patients
showed major difficulties, with spatial and temporal context recall
at floor. For the RK judgments, Valentine was unable to justify her
R responses and Jocelyne could not grasp the difference between
Remember and Know judgments, despite clear explanations. Simi-
lar difficulties were found when an autobiographical memory was
used (TEMPau task, Piolino et al., 2009). Furthermore, the two
patients recalled fewer specific autobiographical memories than
controls with a clear lack of episodic details (for similar findings,
see Kwan et al., 2010). In general, these studies point to a specific
recollection deficit in DA. However, the recollection/familiarity
dissociation may not always be as clear-cut. Using the R/K para-
digm and the ROC procedure, Rosenbaum et al. (2011) reported
a case in which both recollection and familiarity appeared to be
impaired, although there was a trend toward greater deficit in
recollection.
Metamemory studies
Of the different etiologies of childhood neuropathology reviewed
in this section, children with TBI are the only population where
metamemory research using contemporary experimental para-
digms has already begun. Considering that axonal injury and focal
lesions to frontal cortical areas of the brain are the most com-
mon forms of pathology following childhood TBI (Tong et al.,
2004), it is probable that disruption to frontally guided networks
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org December 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 212 | 6
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Souchay et al. Episodic memory: a neurodevelopmental approach
such as those supporting recollection and metamemory will be
impaired. To the best of our knowledge, only three experimental
studies using metamemory judgments in children with TBI have
been reported, all by the same research group. Hanten et al. (2000)
measured children’s metacognitive awareness during a multi-trial
verbal learning task. In this study, a small group of children with
a mixed level of TBI severity (see Table 1) and an age-matched
control group were asked to make an Ease of Learning (EOL) and
a JOL prediction with respect to their recall performance after a
2-h delay. Contrary to previous reports, Hanten et al., did not find
significant differences in recall performance between the TBI and
the control group either across the four learning trials or after the
delay. However, significant differences were found with respect to
the two metamemory measures, such that children with TBI were
less accurate at judging the ease with which an item would be
learned (EOL) as well as at predicting recall of an item (JOL). In
another study, Hanten et al. (2004) tested 37 children with severe
and 40 children with mild TBI, and compared their performance
to an age-matched control group in the same verbal learning par-
adigm. Similarly to that found by Hanten et al. (2000), learning
and forgetting rates did not differentiate between the groups. With
respect to metamemory, all groups tended to overestimate their
future recall performance, but children with TBI (i.e., irrespective
of severity) did so to a significantly greater degree. Furthermore,
the severe group had particular difficulty accurately predicting
their performance on the EOL measure. By contrast, no differ-
ences were found between the three groups on JOLs suggesting
that after gaining experience of the learning task, children with
TBI were as able as typically developing children to monitor their
learning.
In an attempt to elucidate recovery of memory and metamem-
ory function following childhood TBI, Crowther et al. (2011)
classified children with TBI into mild, moderate, and severe groups
and considered memory and metamemory performance in a
multi-trial verbal learning task across five assessments over a 2 year
period. The results indicated that children with moderate and
severe TBI showed the greatest improvement across all measures
over time, but the performance gap between them and the mild
TBI group increased. Contrary to some of the earlier studies with
smaller samples, brain injury severity did affect levels of learning
across trials in this study. TBI severity was also associated with
poorer JOL accuracy.
AUTISM
Autism is a NDD that primarily affects social interaction and
communication (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). In this
review we present studies including adults and children and report
all studies in the Table 2.
Episodic memory studies
The “developmental disconnection model” links the symptoms of
autism spectrum disorder (ASD) to weak functional connectiv-
ity in the brain (Belmonte et al., 2004), and neuroimaging sug-
gests that, for example, deficient self-reflective thought processes
(e.g., Theory of Mind) are directly linked to brain abnormali-
ties. A growing literature has also identified memory impairment
in autism. Most studies have explored memory in adults with
high-functioning autism or Asperger syndrome. Word-pair asso-
ciation learning has been used widely in autism to assess episodic
memory (Boucher and Warrington, 1976). Numerous studies have
shown that performance on recognition and cued-recall tasks is
mostly unimpaired in autism (see Boucher et al., 2012 for a recent
review). In fact, research into ASD has only revealed subtle impair-
ments in episodic memory, particularly on free recall tasks of
semantically related word lists (see Boucher et al., 2012). Fur-
thermore, no deficits have been reported on semantic memory
tasks (Salmond et al., 2005; Bowler et al., 2007; Lind and Bowler,
2009; Wojcik et al., 2013a). Several studies suggest that the mem-
ory profile observed in ASD is again linked to abnormalities of the
hippocampal formation and other neural regions including the
amygdala and the frontal cortex (Boucher et al., 2005; Salmond
et al., 2005).
The recollection of children with ASD has been examined with
source memory tasks, which might point to a deficit in the retrieval
of specifics; an idea which is congruent with the notion that higher
order and self-reflective processes are impaired in ASD. Only a very
few studies have explored the detail retrieved in ASD (see Bon
et al., 2012). The studies report conflicting findings. For example,
in a first study, Bennetto et al. (1996) used temporal intrusions
as a measure of source memory. Participants (adolescents with
ASD and TD controls) were given the California Verbal Learn-
ing Test (CVLT; Delis et al., 1987) and the number of intrusions
of items from previous lists was measured. It was found that the
responses of adolescents with ASD included more intrusions than
responses of controls. Participants with ASD also had lower per-
formance when asked to indicate which items had been presented
most recently. Using a similar recency task with picture stimuli,
Gras-Vincendon et al. (2007) explored this further and found
no deficit in adults with ASD. However, Bigham et al. (2010)
demonstrated recency judgment impairments in low functioning
children/adolescents with ASD. In a more recent study (detailed
below), Souchay et al. (2013) showed that adolescents with ASD
could recall different types of source information correctly (voice,
color, spatial, and temporal localization). However, other studies
have suggested that source memory might be more impaired in
ASD when the contextual information involves a social aspect, as
impairments in social functioning are a primary characteristic of
ASD (O’Shea et al., 2005). In other words, it could be that contex-
tual information of the social type is particularly impaired in ASD,
mirroring the more fundamentally social nature of this disorder.
Furthermore, the recall of contextual information can sometimes
be spared alongside an impairment in subjective experience, thus
revealing a fractionation of recollection itself. In autism these find-
ings fit well with the brain abnormalities reported in the activation
of the default-mode network in autism, and possibly point toward
the importance of the self in episodic memory and metamemory
functioning (Klein, 2013).
Turning to the RK paradigm, adults with Asperger’s syndrome
have consistently shown a reduced number of Remember judg-
ments (Bowler et al., 2000a,b, 2007; Tanweer et al., 2010). In a
recent study, Souchay et al. (2013) explored subjective states asso-
ciated with episodic retrieval in adolescents with ASD. The novelty
of this study was to measure recollection using objective and sub-
jective methods in the same task. In three different experiments,
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Table 2 | Key findings on episodic memory and metamemory in Autism.
Reference Age (years) Main finding
Boucher and Warrington
(1976)
9 (Exp. 1), 13 (Exp. 2), 12 (Exp. 3),
10 (Exp. 4), 14 (Exp. 5)
Impaired recall and recognition and spared cued recall in ASD
Lind and Bowler (2009) 8 Spared performance on a delayed self-recognition task
Bowler et al. (2007) 33 (Exp1), 33 (Exp. 2), 35 (Exp. 3) Fewer Remember responses in Asperger syndrome
Gras-Vincendon et al. (2007) 24 Spared memory for temporal context
O’Shea et al. (2005) 10 Impaired source memory for social context
Salmond et al. (2005) 12 Selective episodic memory impairment and preserved semantic memory
Souchay et al. (2013) 14 Spared recollection as tested by objective measures (source memory tasks), but
relatively impaired recollection as tested by subjective measures (R/K paradigm)
Bowler et al. (2000a) 29 (Exp. 1 and 2) Comparable to typical performance on illusory memory task, but memory
characterized by a know -like rather than remember -like profile
Bennetto et al. (1996) 16 Impaired temporal order memory
Tanweer et al. (2010) 34 Poorer recall of AM in Asperger syndrome (AS). Personal memories recalled
related to K rather than R responses
Wilkinson et al. (2010) 13 Inaccurate metacognitive judgments-of-confidence in a face recognition task in
children with ASD
Wojcik et al. (2011) 11 Accurate judgment of confidence on a self-performed action task
Wojcik et al. (2013b) 12 (Exp. 1), 13 (Exp. 2) Spared immediate and delayed judgment-of-learning
Wojcik et al. (2013a) 12 Impaired episodic FOK, spared semantic FOK
the same group of participants was presented with information
to learn in a specific context (color and voice in Experiment 1,
temporal context in Experiment 2, and spatial context in Experi-
ment 3). At the recognition stage, all participants reported R or K
(subjective measure). Furthermore, after the recognition task, they
performed a source memory task (objective measure) in which all
items presented at encoding were re-presented and participants
were asked to recall the source. All three experiments showed that
adolescents with ASD could, like Typically Developing controls,
correctly recall source information. This suggests that recollec-
tion, as measured by the retrieval of contextual information, is
preserved in adolescents with ASD. However, recollection as mea-
sured by the subjective report, was shown to be impaired, at least
in Experiment 1, where the ASD group gave significantly fewer
Remember responses than controls. These findings point to a spe-
cific and subtle recollection impairment in adolescents with ASD.
Souchay et al. (2013) propose that memory in autism, and in par-
ticular recollective experience, might be characterized by a lack of
rich details related to the self. This interpretation fits with the rest-
ing state connectivity studies in autism showing abnormalities of
the default-mode network including: the ventral medial prefrontal
cortex, the posterior cingulate/retrosplenial cortex, inferior pari-
etal lobule, lateral temporal cortex, dorsal medial prefrontal cortex,
and hippocampal formation (DMN) (Buckner et al., 2008). Sev-
eral studies have now shown that the DMN plays a putative role
in self-referential representations (Buckner et al., 2008), and the
implication is that although source information is accessible in
ASD it does not give rise to the same experience of remembering,
nor is not bound into a whole representation which is re-activated
by re-experiencing the event in the past.
Metamemory studies
In autism, studies exploring whether or not children, adolescents,
or even adults can reflect metacognitively on their memory and
their episodic contents are scarce (see Figure 2 for a summary).
Some research has considered memory confidence, and produced
equivocal findings. These judgments-of-Confidence (JOCs), con-
sist of asking participants to estimate the correctness of their
answer once they have produced it. Some research points to
a deficit in this capacity. For instance, Wilkinson et al. (2010)
investigated JOC in children with ASD using a face recognition
task – an ability thought to be impaired in autism (e.g., Rouse
et al., 2004; Molesworth et al., 2005). After studying 24 face pho-
tographs participants carried out a recognition test in which they
were presented with 48 photographs and had to recognize the faces
presented earlier. Children gave JOCs by reporting whether they
were “certain,” “somewhat certain,” or “guessing” their answers.
Memory performance did not vary with the levels of certainty in
the ASD group. In short, children with autism did not discriminate
between correct and incorrect responses in their confidence judg-
ments. However, Wojcik et al. (2011) showed that children and
adolescents with ASD made as accurate JOCs as controls when
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FIGURE 2 | Metamemory findings in autism spectrum disorder.
asked to predict their recall of school-like instructions (e.g., pick
up the red ruler and put it in the yellow box, then touch the blue
pencil). Thus, studies exploring accuracy of judgments made on
information retrieved have revealed contradictory findings, but
the extent to which this might relate to the materials in question,
or sample differences is not known.
To explore metamemory during encoding,Wojcik et al. (2013b)
explored accuracy of JOLs predictions. The aims of this exper-
iment were to see whether participants with ASD would make
accurate JOL predictions and also whether JOL accuracy would
vary with the time at which JOLs are elicited. Both healthy chil-
dren (Schneider et al., 2000; Koriat and Shitzer-Reichert, 2002)
and adults (Nelson and Dunlosky, 1991) show that delayed JOLs
(made some time after study) are far more accurate than immedi-
ate JOLs (made immediately after study); this is a robust delayed
JOL effect. According to Dunlosky and Nelson (1992), this effect
occurs because the delayed JOL is based on information which in
fact resembles the information retrieved from long-term mem-
ory when searching for the target word; thus the effect pertains
to the monitoring of episodic processes during retrieval. Wojcik
et al. (2013b) presented children with ASD with two separate
immediate and delayed JOL tasks. They presented two sets of
24 word pairs at study (e.g., dog-CAR). For the immediate JOL
task, after studying each pair they were re-presented with the
cue word and asked to make a JOL by predicting whether in
about 5 min they would be able to recall the target word when
shown the cue word. In the delayed condition, JOLs were given
in the same way but after the study of all pairs. The results
showed that children with ASD could accurately predict their
later recall with both types of JOL, and critically, like TD chil-
dren they could switch to using more appropriate mnemonic
cues. Such an effect arguably demonstrates an ability to use
retrieval from memory in order to accurately gage future mem-
ory performance, a self-reflective capacity. Finally, Wojcik et al.
(2013a) used the episodic FOK (Souchay et al., 2000) paradigm
to explore self-reflecting processes at the retrieval stage. Children
with ASD were found to give inaccurate episodic FOK judg-
ments in comparison to typical children, suggesting impairment
in estimating content at retrieval when information is not eas-
ily accessible (the same study showed that semantic FOK was
unimpaired).
There are thus conflicting findings in the autism literature,
which we have posited might be influenced by the type of informa-
tion required to make the metamemory judgments. People with
ASD may be particularly impaired at the type of reflection cap-
tured in feelings of remembering, which we have argued elsewhere
are particularly necessary for producing accurate episodic FOK
judgments (Souchay et al., 2007; Wojcik et al., 2013a). Of partic-
ular interest, the brain network engaged in metamemory (Kikyo
et al., 2002; Maril et al., 2003; Kikyo and Miyashita, 2004; Schnyer
et al., 2005) and recollection (Yonelinas, 2002; Eichenbaum et al.,
2007) shows some overlap with the brain network found under-
active in autism. Thus, a decrease in functional activity of these
brain networks could lead to some metamemory judgments being
inaccurate, such as episodic FOK judgments, and this would pre-
sumably have consequences for the regulation and higher order
control of episodic memory.
WILLIAMS SYNDROME, DOWN SYNDROME, AND 22Q11.2 DELETION
SYNDROME
A recent development in the scientific literature consists of explor-
ing cognition in genetic disorders. Amongst the most explored dis-
orders in children are Williams syndrome (WS), DS, and 22q11.2
deletion syndrome (22q11DS). However, despite the recent growth
in this research field, studies exploring episodic memory and
metamemory are again scarce in these populations. Furthermore,
interpreting the deficits observed relies on our current knowl-
edge of the neural circuits involved in the normal functioning of
the memory and the maturation of those specific circuits in these
genetic disorders. This section presents a summary of the few stud-
ies exploring recollection and subjective states of episodic memory
in WS, DS, and 22q11DS and an attempt will be made to link with
brain functioning. We report these findings in Table 3.
Williams syndrome
Williams syndrome is a relatively rare NDD (prevalence of 1 in
20,000 births) with confirmed genetic origin (random deletion of
approximately 25 genes on chromosome 7, specifically 7q11.23;
Ewart et al., 1993). Recently this disorder has attracted a great
deal of attention due to the unique aspects of social, behavioral,
and cognitive deficits. The cognitive profile in WS is characterized
by deficits in executive functioning (Rhodes et al., 2010; Carney
et al., 2013) and many studies assessing working memory have now
demonstrated a dissociation between relatively proficient skills
within the verbal domain and more severe impairments associ-
ated with visuo-spatial processing (Hoffman et al., 2003; Vicari
et al., 2003).
In WS, studies exploring episodic memory are in their infancy.
Long-term memory studies have confirmed the dissociation
between verbal and visual tasks (Vicari et al., 1996; Edgin et al.,
2010). Furthermore, several studies have compared performance
in WS in recall and recognition tasks. Jarrold et al. (2007) showed
that recall was more impaired than recognition, although Vicari
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Table 3 | Key findings on episodic memory and metamemory in children and adolescents with genetic disorders.
Article/etiology Age
(years)
Main finding
WILLIAMS SYNDROME
Edgin et al. (2010) 18 Deficits in spatial and verbal associative memory compared to individuals with Down syndrome
Costanzo et al. (2013) 20 Reduced recollection and spared familiarity on the process dissociation procedure and task dissociation procedure
Jarrold et al. (2007) 18 Poor performance on long-term memory for visual information
Vicari et al. (1996) 10 Long-term memory deficit on verbal and visual tasks
DOWN SYNDROME
Edgin et al. (2010) 17 Deficit in associative memory
Carlesimo et al. (1997) 16 Deficit in explicit memory, difficulties in organizing material at encoding, retrieval deficits
Jarrold et al. (2007) 14 Poor performance on long-term memory for visual information
22q11.2 DELETION SYNDROME
Debbané et al. (2008a) 17 Inefficient recollection-based retrieval, failure to correctly identify contextual information
Debbané et al. (2008b) 14 More source errors, more confusions between exterior sources in which the self was not involved
(2001) reported preserved free recall and recognition of verbal
and visual information. It is generally accepted that familiarity
has a significant role in recognition but not in free recall, which
might point to a deficit in recollection (in recall) but not famil-
iarity (in recognition). However, the conflicting findings in WS
regarding recall and recognition are inconclusive. To clarify this
issue, Costanzo et al. (2013) explored recollection in WS using
two paradigms (PDP and associative recognition) to measure rec-
ollection objectively. Results of the two experimental tasks showed
a reduced contribution of recollection and a preserved contribu-
tion of familiarity. Indeed, the exclusion condition of the PDP
task demonstrated that children with WS failed to remember the
modality in which the items had been presented whereas the asso-
ciative recognition task showed that children with WS failed to
identify the visual stimulus that had been associated with a target
at encoding. According to the authors, these findings suggest that
maturation of memory abilities in children with WS is not globally
delayed but that instead it shows qualitatively different develop-
mental trajectories. This parallels the observations reported by
Meyer-Lindenberg et al. (2005) that the hippocampus in WS shows
differences in shape and functioning (reduced resting blood flow in
the anterior portion of the hippocampus); deficient hippocampal
maturation could potentially underlie poor recollection in WS.
Finally, to the best of our knowledge, no study has yet explored
subjective states either those associated with retrieval in WS, or
the ability to estimate memory as measured by metamemory
judgments.
Down syndrome
Down syndrome affects about 1 in 1000 live births (Sherman
et al., 2007) and is caused by abnormalities of chromosome 21. In
the DS cognitive profile, working memory is typically impaired.
People with DS have a deficit in verbal working memory, with
non-verbal working memory comparatively preserved, presenting
a double dissociation with WS (Baddeley and Jarrold, 2007). More
recently, Lanfranchi et al. (2012) showed executive impairment in
people with DS. In contrast with multiple studies exploring work-
ing memory, only a few studies have explored episodic memory
in DS. Carlesimo et al. (1997) showed reduced free recall and
reduced recognition in DS. More recently, Edgin et al. (2010)
showed reduced associative memory in adolescents with DS on
two tasks: a word list learning task (NEPSY list learning test, Kork-
man et al., 1998) and the spatial Paired Associate Learning (PAL)
task from the CANTAB (Sahakian and Owen, 1992). To the best of
our knowledge, no study has yet explored recollection, subjective
states of episodic memory or metamemory in DS (and this clearly
remains a priority). However, a recent single case study exploring
autobiographical memory in a 22-year-old male with DS, patient
PQ, points to an impairment in recalling detailed memories in
DS. Patient PQ’s autobiographical memory was characterized by a
significantly impoverished recall of specific memories (Robinson
and Temple, 2010). Volumetric MRI studies indicate that people
with DS have smaller volumes in temporal areas including the
hippocampus (Schmidt-Sidor et al., 1990); suggesting that recol-
lection and subjective states of episodic memory might be deficient
in DS, but this area still remains to be explored.
22q11.2 deletion syndrome
22q11.2 Deletion syndrome, also known as velo-cardio-facial syn-
drome (VCFS) is a genetic disorder associated with a microdele-
tion in chromosome 22q11, estimated to occur in one of every
6000 live births (Botto et al., 2003). Behaviorally, people with
22q11DS also often present with schizophrenia or attention
deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) (see Debbané et al., 2006).
A number of studies have explored structural brain differences in
22q11.2DS and these usually report that brain volume in children
is between 8 and 11% smaller than controls. Most neuroimaging
studies report a total hippocampal volume reduction (Debbané
et al., 2006; Kates et al., 2006; Deboer et al., 2007; Flahault et al.,
2012). According to Flahault et al. (2012) this reduction of volume
could be partly due to a reduction in the amount of input received
from connected cortical regions such as the parieto-lateral cor-
tex, the posterior cingulate, and the temporal cortical structures,
known also to be reduced in 22q11.2DS.
Little is known about the cognitive characteristics of this syn-
drome. So far, studies have mainly assessed executive functioning
and all report that people with the 22q11DS have marked impair-
ment in visual attention and executive function (Sobin et al.,
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2004, 2005). A recent study also showed that differences in brain
activation (parietal and occipital regions) explained deficits on
a visuo-spatial working memory task (Azuma et al., 2009), thus
suggesting that differences in the development of specific brain
structures might underpin the cognitive deficits in this population.
Studies exploring episodic memory suggest that people with
22q11.2DS (adolescents and adults) demonstrate similar levels of
recognition performance for materials such as words, pictures, or
even action statements (Debbané et al., 2008a,b). However, Deb-
bané et al. (2008a) showed in two experiments deficient retrieval
skills in adolescents and adults with 22q11.2DS (ages 10–36 years
old). In Experiment 1, a directed forgetting paradigm was used
(e.g., Bjork, 1970), where participants were instructed to control
their encoding according to whether the items were presented
as “to be remembered” or “to be forgotten.” In Experiment 2,
a continuous recognition task was used, in which participants
were asked to identify pictures that appeared twice within a list
of picture items. In this task, several different lists were used. Par-
ticipants were instructed to detect repetitions within the list only;
items presented in previous lists were to be responded to as novel.
In Experiment 1, people with 22q11.2DS were found to produce
more false alarms and in Experiment 2 they were found to have
more commission errors (higher tendency to incorrectly classify
previous list distractors as within list repetitions). The results of
Experiment 2 are of particular interest as they suggest that peo-
ple with 22q11.2DS have specific difficulties in using contextual
information (in this case temporal information: current versus
past list, paradigm adapted from Schnider and Ptak, 1999) to cor-
rectly reject items. According to the authors, these errors might
be due to inefficient binding between target and temporal context
information and therefore could also point to diminished recol-
lection processes in 22q11.2DS. Deficits in contextual information
were also reported by Debbané et al. (2008b) in a source monitor-
ing task in which patients were given action statements and were
asked to imagine themselves performing the action or to imagine
the experimenter performing the action. Results showed that ado-
lescents with 22q11.2DS committed more source confusion errors
than controls. Altogether, these findings thus suggest that recol-
lection, at least as assessed by objective measures (such as source)
is impaired in 22q11.2DS.
To the best of our knowledge, no study has yet explored sub-
jective states of episodic memory either using the RK paradigm or
metamemory judgment paradigms. However, subjective states of
episodic memory as measured by RK are impaired in schizophre-
nia in that patients with schizophrenia report fewer R responses
(Libby et al., 2013) and metamemory has also found to be inac-
curate in schizophrenia (Souchay et al., 2006). Therefore, given
the behavioral similarities observed with people with 22Q11.2, it
seems reasonable to predict impairments in these subjective states
or evaluation of memory contents. This remains a priority for
future research.
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this article was to review the subjective states
associated with episodic retrieval from a neurodevelopmental
perspective. This review supports the idea of a fractionation of
the episodic memory system and clearly suggests that episodic
memory is a multifaceted system as suggested by many theories
(Tulving, 2002; Montaldi and Mayes, 2010; Klein, 2013). Within
these theories, memory contents are experienced as episodic only if
certain operations occur at retrieval, such as retrieval of contextual
information or reflective and self-referential processes. This review
presented some examples within the developmental literature of
dissociations between such processes or different developmental
trajectories.
EPISODIC MEMORY IN TYPICALLY DEVELOPING CHILDREN
The first part of this review (see Typically Developing Children),
highlighted a developmental change in episodic memory in typ-
ically developing children. It is possible to measure separable
contributions of a more automatic, perceptual memory system
(i.e., familiarity) and a more conceptual higher order system (such
as recollection) even at a young age. Clearly however, there are lim-
itations of the episodic memory system in early life. For example,
recollection and familiarity are dissociable at about 5 years (Rig-
gins et al., 2013), but recollection processes continue to develop
until adulthood. Of particular interest, different developmental
trajectories between gist and recollection are found when recollec-
tion is measured objectively by contextual details or subjectively
by first-person experiences of remembering. As they get older,
children report more and more experiences of remembering.
Similarly, increasing evidence suggests that even young children
have insight into their memory contents (see Lyons and Ghetti,
2010). Thus, as children develop, they can form and retrieve richer
episodic memories and evaluate the content of these memories
to guide their learning. This increase in experience of remember-
ing and the formation of rich contextual memories presumably
impacts on the development of metamemory. Indeed, a develop-
ment in the metacognition literature suggests that recollection
is used to guide metacognitive judgments (Hicks and Marsh,
2002; Souchay et al., 2007); predictions of future performance
are more accurate when contextual information can be retrieved
and when there is the feeling of “remembering.” We propose then,
that the development of richer episodic memories influences the
metacognitive assessment of memory content.
Finally, the developmental changes in episodic memory occur
alongside the maturation of the brain (see Ghetti and Bunge, 2012;
Ofen, 2012 for review). Structural and functional imaging stud-
ies suggest a neural specialization with increasing age, such as
for example the developmental shift from posterior to anterior
hippocampus (see Figure 2). The few studies published so far link-
ing brain developmental changes and memory suggest that this
brain specialization parallels the development of episodic mem-
ory and the development of recollection. The complex network of
temporo-frontal structures critical for episodic memory function
in healthy adults, and implicated in memory and metamemory
disorder in brain-injured populations, include some of the last
brain structures to mature. The maturation of brain regions refer-
ring to the social brain and CMS has to be taken into consideration
when examining the development of subjective recollection. The
few studies using social-cognition tasks report an hyperactivation
of the CMS in children compared to adults. The same phenome-
non is observed in studies of mental-state attribution (Blakemore,
2008). These authors suggested that this decrease in activity from
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adolescence to adulthood would be related to an immature or
undefined self-appraisal. To better determine how each of these
brain structures intersects with the development of the different
episodic components, further longitudinal studies are needed. For
example, to the best of our knowledge, no study has yet explored
the development of metacognitive judgments in relation to neural
specialization in children.
EPISODIC MEMORY IN NEURODEVELOPMENTAL DISORDERS
The second part of this review (see Neurodevelopmental Disor-
ders) addressed episodic memory in different NDDs including
acquired amnesia, autism, and genetic disorders. This review
shows that this strand of research is still in its infancy and that
most studies exploring subjective states of episodic memory have
been done in children with acquired amnesia and autism whilst
such studies are rare in genetic disorders. Despite the novelty of
this type of research, the main outcome of these studies is to show
that across a broad set of different NDDs there are various types
of episodic memory impairment, each with possibly a different
character. This literature is thus in agreement with the idea that
episodic memory is a multifaceted process (Klein et al., 2004) and
that therefore fractionations or dissociations might occur.
Clearly, a child with autism does not present with the same
kind of memory deficit as a child with an acquired head injury, but
nonetheless they may fail the same episodic memory task, albeit
for different reasons. For example, the literature presented here
suggests that acquired amnesia is characterized by source memory
deficits, whilst in ASD these source memory deficits might be spe-
cific to the self. If we can understand the separate contributions
to episodic memory impairment implicated in each clinical group
in correspondence with their brain damage, we should be able to
determine whether a specific brain lesion can affect the develop-
ment of an episodic component in particular, or if such a lesion
will have broader consequences in terms of episodic memory. We
will also be better able to compensate for failing mechanisms, and
emphasize intact abilities (as has been suggested as an outcome of
the metacognition research in autism, for example (Wojcik et al.,
2013a).
As an example, consider that Souchay et al. (2013) present a
case where a group of people with autism can successfully report
the source of an item, but yet, this does not seem to be cap-
tured in their subjective experience of remembering. The objective
information drawn from recollection, does not seem to be phe-
nomenologically re-experienced in the same way as in controls.
In other words, the capacity to retrieve episodic content (source
information) could be dissociated from the ability to introspect on
the memory content (R responses). Similarly, Wojcik et al. (2013a)
showed that a capacity to retrieve memory content (cued recall)
was associated with inaccurate introspection (FOK judgments).
Interestingly, the dissociations observed in ASD, in some ways res-
onate with the case of patient R.B. summarized in Klein (2013)
presenting a dissociation between memory content (source) and
sense of ownership. Here then, we attempt a fractionation of the
recollection processes critical to episodic memory function. To
attempt such a fractionation, we will have to see episodic mem-
ory dysfunction as something rather more nebulous and complex
than forgetting (Klein et al., 2004). Recent work suggests that
metacognitive judgments and agency judgments are interrelated
and thus capture similar processes (Cosentino et al., 2011). Such
a relationship would be worth exploring in NDDs to examine this
fractionation of episodic memory.
We suggest that to achieve a better understanding of how
episodic memory and subjective states of episodic memory
develop- and the brain regions involved-further investigations
are needed. For example, studies in NDDs could start by explor-
ing whether or not children with NDDs understand the differ-
ence between “remembering” and “knowing.” Indeed, Jon’s case
has shown that individuals who grow up without a functional
episodic memory system may not be able to appreciate the differ-
ence between “remembering” and “knowing.” This concern that
amnesic patients may not be able to reliably introspect about their
own memory processes has been raised in the adult literature as
well (Turriziani et al., 2008). This contrasts with the studies in the
metamemory literature showing that amnesic patients can pre-
dict their memory performance accurately (Janowsky et al., 1989).
That is, a fractionation could occur between different subjective
states or different ways of introspecting. Introspection (or cog-
nitive monitoring) is crucial to guide strategic behavior (Nelson
and Narens, 1990). Thus, other forms of introspection could be
explored in children with NDDs, and especially those involved
in early strategic behavior such as uncertainty judgments (Lyons
and Ghetti, 2013). Neurodevelopmental studies could also assess
sense of ownership, agency, and authorship to see if these disso-
ciate from the memory content (see Synofzik et al., 2008 for a
theoretical framework to explore agency and ownership). In this
context, how the self develops in relationship to episodic mem-
ory could be considered through ownership. Indeed, van den Bos
et al. (2010) have shown that when participants were asked to sort
items into baskets, a self-ownership effect was found on recogni-
tion and more for Remember than Know responses. Furthermore,
in a more recent study, Cunningham et al. (2013) found that this
effect could be used with very young children, thus showing how
the self shape memory performance. Such paradigms could be of
particular interest to explore in NDDs. Finally, the quality of the
episodic contents recalled should also be examined. For example,
in adults with Asperger’s syndrome, Bowler et al. (2007) showed
that the quality of the justifications given to R responses were
similar to the ones given by controls, suggesting a difference in
quantity and not quality. This issue is particularly important from
a developmental perspective and for example in neurogenetic dis-
orders. Do the memory processes just develop later and/or in a
qualitatively different manner? Such studies could help us to deter-
mine whether or not the content of a memory and the operations
occurring at retrieval can be dissociated.
To conclude, we have shown that different episodic processes
develop at different rates, and can be dissociated in different clin-
ical groups. In fact it is relatively early in the field to make any
strong claims, except that subjective experiences and strategic fac-
tors are both critical in the regulation of memory and should
therefore be explored further in NDDs. Indeed, where one or
other of these processes is impaired or delayed developmentally,
there will be consequences in the cognitive system which will be of
interest to clinicians and educators working with individuals with
neurodevelopmentally disordered groups.
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